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The dangers of permitting powerful economic groups thus to reinforce their superior
bargaining position9 can be avoided by court action limiting the effectiveness of these
standardized contracts. To protect the automobile dealer, as in the instant case, courts
might construe the termination-at-will and other inequitable provisions strongly
against the manufacturer and imply the requirements of just and reasonable cause and
good faith.
Corporations-Banks and Banking-Extension of Double Liability to Non-Banking
Functions-[New York].-A trust company organized under the New York Bank-
ing Law' was merged, pursuant to provisions of the New York Insurance Law,2
with a title and mortgage guarantee company organized under the New York In-
surance Law.s The new company carried on the business of each of the merged com-
panies, the title and mortgage guarantee business being conducted in one department
under the supervision of the Superintendent of Insurance, and the banking and
trust business in a separate department, with separate accounts, under the super-
vision of the Superintendent of Banks. The title and mortgage guarantee business
was the main4 source of income of the company. In 1933 the banking and trust busi-
ness was terminateds and the claims against that department were paid out of the
common funds of the company.6 An attempt was made to continue the title and
mortgage guarantee business, but in June 1935, it too was placed in liquidation.
The remaining assets being insufficient to pay all the debts,7 suit was brought by the
Superintendent of Insurance, on behalf of creditors of the title and mortgage depart-
ment, to enforce the double liability provisions applicable to stockholders of trust
companies.8 The lower court dismissed the suit on the ground that the double liability
provisions rendered the stockholders liable for only such debts as were incurred by the
corporation in its capacity as a banking and trust company. On appeal to the appel-
late division, held, that a corporation possessing and exercising banking powers is a
39 Ibid., at i44.
x N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, § go et seq.
2 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 194o) c. 28, § 441. There is no similar provision in Illinois.
3 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1940) C. 28, § 430 et seq.
4 Four-fifths of the income of the company before 1933 was derived from its title and
mortgage guarantee business. Brief of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 3.
' Following a suggestion of the Superintendent of Banks, the directors of the company had
previously voted to operate the two departments as separate corporate units, but the general
condition of the banking system at that time made it impossible to carry out the plan. Brief
of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 4.
6 Cash was obtained by sale of approximately $4,000,000 of assets to a syndicate of New
York banks. Both the Superintendent of Banks and the Superintendent of Insurance ap-
proved the plan. Brief of Defendants-Respondents Bailey et al., at 4.
7 The deficiency amounted to approximately $12,000,000. The value of the assets in
the possession of the Superintendent of Insurance at the time of suit was estimated at not
more than Si,oooooo; the par value of the outstanding stock aggregated $2,000,000. Reply
Brief of Superintendent of Insurance, at 14.
8 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, § ii3-a.
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corporation "for banking purposes,"9 and the liability of the stockholders extends to
all the debts of the company. Order reversed. Pink v. Alden.1o
Inasmuch as the decision in the instant case extends the protection of stockholder
liability to a class of creditors to whom it would not ordinarily be applicable, it seems
to go beyond the intended scope of the statutory provision." Double liability was im-
posed upon the stockholders of banking corporations because the public importance of
the banking system required more than the ordinary degree of responsibility.12 The
protection of depositors appears to have been the primary consideration,'3 but the im-
portance of protecting the general credit of the bank and of insuring the vigilance of
the stockholders was also recognized,4 and the provisions were therefore made en-
forcible for the benefit of all the creditors of banks and trust companies.'s
Since the corporation in the instant case engaged in the banking and trust business,
the court held that it should be viewed as a corporation "for banking purposes," despite
the fact that no stockholder liability is imposed for the benefit of creditors of a title
and mortgage guarantee business. It may be argued that since a trust company has
power to issue certificates essentially similar to those issued by title and mortgage
guarantee companies, x6 this new corporation should be viewed as a trust company,
and thus its stockholders should be subject to liability, even in regard to its title and
mortgage guarantee business.'7 But the certificates may equally well be viewed as
issued under the authority obtained by the former title and mortgage guarantee com-
pany, and, since in this case they were issued under the regulation of the Superin-
tendent of Insurance rather than of the Superintendent of Banks, this appears to be
the correct view.
9 The former Article 8, § 7 of the New York Constitution imposed individual responsibility
upon the stockholders of every corporation "for banking purposes .... for all its debts and
liabilities of every kind."
10 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 365 (App. Div. 194o).
-In the only other case which has been found involving a similar statutory problem,
the opposite result was reached. Xiggins v. Munday, 19 Wash. 233, 52 Pac. 855 (I898).
"2 Skinner v. Schwab, 188 App. Div. 457, 177 N.Y. Supp. 143 (i919), aff'd 229 N.Y. 539,
549, 127 N.E. 921, 922 (1920). After creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and the abolition of the double liability which had attached to the stock of national banks
(48 Stat. 168, 189 (1933), i U.S.C.A. §§ 64a, 264 (1936)), the Banking Board of the State of
New York recommended the repeal of the double liability clause of the New York State Con-
stitution. N.Y. Legis. Doc., No. 24, at 12 (x934). Pursuant to this recommendation the re-
peal of Article 8, § 7was proposed to thepeople. N.Y.L. (1934), at 1876; N.Y.L. (1935), at 1912.
-The people voted to repeal the section in November 1935. N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney,
1939), Const. art. 8, § 7, Historical Note.
3 Bishop and Atree, Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for Re-
vision of the [New York] Constitution 985 (1846).
14 3 Zollmann, Banks and Banking § 1612 (1936).
'5 Flynn v. American Banking & Trust Co., 104 Me. 141, 69 Ad. 771 (19o8); Klotz v. First
Nat'l Bank, 78 Ind. App. 679, 134 N.E. 220 (1922); Hirshfeld v. Fitzgerald, Is7 N.Y. 166,
51 N.E. 997 (1898)-
'6 N.Y.L. (194) c. 369, § 185.9, repealed by N.Y.L. (1937) c. 619, § 139.3. See Ops. Att'y
Gen'l of N.Y. (1902), at 232.
'7 Brief of Superintendent of Insurance, at 28.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
That this corporation performed banking functions does not prove that it was a
corporation "for banking purposes,"'' the stockholders of which were intended by the
legislature to be liable for all its debts. Since the constitutional provision for double
liability is not self-executing,9 it would seem that if this new type of corporation had
been viewed as one "for banking purposes" within the purview of the constitution,
some provision for the enforcement of double liability as to it should have appeared in
the insurance statute authorizing the merger.20 Instead, the statute merely provided
that the then existing creditors of the trust company should not be prejudiced by the
merger. This would seem to indicate that the corporation contemplated therein was not
considered to be a corporation "for banking purposes."
However, imposition of double liability for the banking activities of this corporation
appears desirable. It would hardly be suggested that it was intended to permit
this corporation to engage in the banking and trust business without assuming the
responsibilities incident thereto. Assuming that the new corporation should not be
viewed as a corporation "for banking purposes," the stockholders of which would be
liable for all its debts, it would still be possible to reach a desirable result in the
instant case. Viewing the banking and trust department of the company separately, it
would seem to be an organization "for banking purposes" within the purview of the
constitution, and to be subject to regulation by the Superintendent of Banks under
the banking law.21 Such regulation could not be effective unless the Superintendent of
Banks is also vested with authority to require this department to keep separate ac-
counts and to require reserves for the claims of the banking and trust creditors. If in
this situation a deficiency in the Banking Department should occur, the Superintend-
ent of Banks would have power to enforce double liability for the benefit of these
creditors. Should assets be diverted from the title and mortgage guarantee department
to pay the claims of the banking and trust creditors, the title and mortgage guarantee
creditors could be said to have been injured to the extent of the diversion. Since such a
diversion would have the effect of reducing or eliminating the claims of the banking
and trust creditors against the stockholders at the expense of the title and mortgage
guarantee creditors, the latter could be subrogated to the claims of the former.22 The
failure in the actual case to maintain a physical separation of assets does not appear to
detract from the force of the foregoing argument so long as it remains possible to de-
termine the amount of the actual diversion of the funds of the title and mortgage
guarantee creditors.23 The failure of the court to adopt this approach forced it into a
X8 Skinner v. Schwab, 188 App. Div. 457, 464, 177 N.Y. Supp. 143, 148 (1919), aff'd 229
N.Y. 539, 127 N.E. 921 (1920), the only case cited by the court as authority for the contrary
proposition, appears to restrict application of the statutory liability to "those undertaking to
care for the moneys of others and derive a profit therefrom, in the manner usually followed in
the banking business."
19 Broderick v. Weinsier, 278 N.Y. 419, i6 N.E. (2d) 387 (1938).
20 N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1940) c. 28, § 441
2, N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, § io-a, declares it to be the policy of the state
of New York that "the business of all banking organizations shall be supervised and regulated
through the banking department."
22 Pittsburgh-Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Kerr, 220 N.Y. 137, 11 N.E. 465 (igTT).
23 In Kiggins v. Munday, 19 Wash. 233, 52 Pac. 855 (1898), although there was no separa-
tion of accounts of the various branches of the business, the court held it possible to segregate
the various claims.
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choice between two undesirable results: either to place the title and mortgage guar-
antee creditors of this company in a better position than similar creditors of other title
and mortgage companies not engaged in the banking business, or to place them in a
relatively worse position by allowing diversion of the assets of the company into the
hands of the banking and trust creditors.'4 In order to place the title and mortgage
guarantee creditors in a position to enforce double liability, the court was forced to a
questionable interpretation of the applicable procedural provisions of the Banking
Law,2s by which exclusive authority to enforce double liability is vested in the Superin-
tendent of Banks.26 It may be suggested that by use of the doctrine of subrogation, the
title and mortgage guarantee creditors of the company would have been provided a
sounder basis of protection, while at the same time the stockholders would have been
protected by the use of a measure of recovery more commensurate with the actual
loss.27
Criminal Law-Grand Jury-Voluntary Communications to Grand Jury as
Criminal Contempt.-[llinois].-The defendant wrote two inflammatory letters to the
regularly impanelled grand jury in which he offered to present on oath evidence of a
conspiracy among the state's attorney, the county assessor, and a newspaper to de-
fraud the state of revenue. Upon the filing of an information prepared by the state's
attorney, incorporating the letters, the defendant was adjudged guilty of criminal con-
tempt. On appeal, held, that the communication voluntarily made to the grand jury
obstructed the due administration of justice and was therefore a contempt of court.
People v. Parker.'
While, with the institution of public agencies for the prosecution of crime, the early
common law power' of the grand jury to prefer indictments at the instance of private
24 See Pink v. Alden, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 365, 368 (App. Div. 194o).
as N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 2, §§ 8o, 1x3-a.
26 The court in the instant case avoided the procedural difficulty as follows: a creditor of
a bank or trust company holding an unsatisfied judgment may bring suit to enforce the double
liability provisions when the Superintendent of Banks has possession and fails or refuses to
bring suit. In the instant case the Superintendent of Banks could not have possession because
the company was already in the possession of the Superintendent of Insurance, and the credi-
tors could not obtain judgment because all creditors' actions were enjoined by the court in the
rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings. Since the performance of these conditions is there-
fore impossible, the creditors are excused from performance thereof, and may bring suit. Pink
v. Alden, 23 N.Y.S. (2d) 365, 370 (App. Div. i940). This reasoning was of course based on the
assumption that the creditors were to be viewed as creditors of a banking and trust company.
27 The advantage gained by the title and mortgage guarantee creditors through the acquisi-
tion of power to enforce double liability in their own right may prove more theoretical than
actual in the present case, since the deficiency of banking assets in relation to banking claims
may prove to exceed the $2,ooo,ooo par value of the outstanding stock, which is the upper limit
of recovery under any theory.
' 3o N.E. (2d) ix (Ill. i94o).
2Thompson and Merriam, Juries § 6og (1882); Regina v. Russell, Car. & M. 247, 174 Eng.
Rep. R. 492 (1841); In re Opinion to the Governor, 4 A. (2d) 487 (R.I. 1939). For statutory
provisions in various states see American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (with
commentaries) 484 (1931).
